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Middlesex University 
Introduction 
In his collection of essays On History, Fernand Braudel offers us a 
moving image for the nature of historical events. Commenting in reference 
to a display of fireflies he says, “their pale lights glowed, went out, shone 
again, all without piercing the night with any true illumination. So it is with 
events; beyond their glow, darkness prevails.”1 Although it is the glow of an 
event that catches our eye and fascinates us, Braudel argues that this is only 
the initial (and at times most superficial) element of historical 
understanding. Such events emerge from an impenetrable milieu – a 
darkness or contingency – and this black night must be taken seriously. This 
means that even the brightest of stars must be related to the indeterminate 
realm that they light up. Two methods for achieving this offer themselves. 
On the one hand, we could carve out the historical event from its field of 
indeterminacy by graphing its flight from above; we could, in other words, 
come to know the coordinates of the event. But on the other hand, we could 
follow the firefly as its weaves through the night by placing ourselves within 
its line of flight; we could, according to this other method, come to know the 
life of an event by living with it. 
When developing their theory of the event, Deleuze and Guattari seize 
upon a similar conceptual distinction. As they state: 
[T]here are two ways of considering the event. One 
consists in going over the course of the event, in recording 
its effectuation in history, its conditioning and 
deterioration in history. But the other consists in 
reassembling the event, installing oneself in it as in a 
becoming, becoming young again and aging in it, both at 
the same time, going through all its components or 
singularities.2 
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Much like Braudel, this passage describes how Deleuze and Guattari seek to 
get inside the environs of an event in order to gain an understanding of it 
that goes deeper than firefly watching. This theory of the event, however, 
can be directly traced to Deleuze’s reading of Charles Péguy’s work Clio.3 In 
the two versions of this essay, Péguy illustrates a theme that is common to 
all of his historical commentaries: factual details, on their own, are 
insufficient for understanding an historical event; what is also needed is an 
appreciation of the spirit of an age, people and/or movement – its mystique.4 
But as Deleuze and Guattari echo the insights of Péguy and Braudel, a 
curious transformation takes place. Whereas for Péguy and Braudel the 
reassembling of (and placing oneself within) the event was a way of 
practicing and understanding history, for Deleuze and Guattari this 
alternative method is directly positioned against history and the historical. 
How then has this occurred? 
In this paper I will show how there are two different forms of history at 
work in Deleuzian ontology: one which could be characterised as opposed to 
becoming, and another which is in productive union with it. Drawing from 
the intimations of Braudel and Péguy above, the location of this alternative 
notion of history will be beyond the superficial glow and within the event - 
it will occur in the depths. In its colloquial context, depth is often used to 
indicate the past and history. For example, to understand a present situation 
“in depth” is in many respects (though not all) to have experience, 
familiarity or knowledge of its past. However, as we will see, it is equally 
plausible to consider Deleuze’s notion of intensive-depth as compatible with 
a kind of history.  
To do so, this paper will reunite Deleuze’s concept of intensive-depth 
with several of its most significant sources: Braudel, Péguy and one of 
Deleuze’s most important ontological touchstones, Henri Bergson. By 
emphasising how these other thinkers develop a theory of intensive 
production that is (in part) historical in nature, Deleuze’s work will be 
reappraised to see what it might have to offer a philosophy of historical 
creativity – that is, a form of history that is not static and fixating, but rather 
a dynamic force of creativity. But if this attempt is to be successful, two 
questions must be adequately addressed: can history be intensive, and if so, 
is the placing of ourselves into the depths of the past, so that we may move 
with it as it becomes, a viable ontology and methodology of history? In 
responding to these questions, this paper will not only carry out a 
reconciliation of history with becoming in the work of Deleuze; more 
importantly, it will indicate how Deleuze can provide a significant 
contribution to the lineage of thinkers who believe in a truly creative 
historical ontology. 
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Historical Intensities 
Deleuze’s concept of intensity, it might initially seem, would not be a 
prudent place to look for a philosophy of history. This is because history, as 
we will shortly see, is often associated by Deleuze with those things that are 
decidedly un-intensive. The most obvious place for history would therefore 
seem to be on the side of extensity rather than intensity. While this is no 
doubt true, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that this is not all that 
history can be or become; aside from the figure of extensive history, there is 
another form of history in Deleuze that can be legitimately described as 
intensive. But before we can challenge the initial assumption and limitations 
of extensive history, we must first set out what Deleuze means by intensity. 
In the process, possibilities for an intensive concept of history (and vice 
versa) will begin to emerge. 
Taking up Kant’s brief discussion of intensive magnitudes in the 
“Anticipations of Perception,”5 Deleuze distinguishes between two forms of 
quantity: intensive and extensive. Although intensive quantities can be 
measured and ordered, they differ from extensive quantities in that they do 
not adhere to a whole-part metric that would allow them to be manipulated 
by procedures such as addition. For example, if one body of water 
measuring 10°C is added to another body of water measuring 20°C, the two 
do not add up to 30°C. Likewise, the sensation of my body moving at 20kph 
is not reducible to a summation of the sensations my body experiences 
moving at 15kph and 5kph, for if it were so then I could claim that I know 
what it is like to move at the speed of light (and beyond). We of course need 
not limit ourselves to examples of temperature or speed – psychological 
experiences such as love and anger are as equally suitable. For example, one 
cannot add-up lesser values of love in order to produce a higher order of 
love (God’s love is of a different order to ours, no matter how many of us 
there are, or how developed we become). In each case, the quantities at issue 
are intensive, and as such are incapable of being divided without effectuating 
a change in its nature.6 
The inability of intensive quantities to be divided without changing in 
kind means that each intensity exists as what Bergson, drawing from 
Riemann, referred to as a continuous multiplicity. Deleuze makes this debt 
clear when he modifies Bergson’s two multiplicities of continuous and 
discrete (or heterogeneous and homogeneous) into implicit and explicit: 
“We must henceforth distinguish between two types of multiplicities […]: 
implicit as opposed to explicit multiplicities; those whose metric varies with 
division and those which carry the invariable principle of their metric.”7 As 
this passage shows us, an intensive magnitude is a heterogeneous or implicit 
multiplicity that cannot be divided without effectuating a change in nature. 
This means that every heterogeneous multiplicity is a singular-composite: 
singular insofar as it is indivisible (without changing what it is into 
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something else), yet a composite of differentiated elements. Another way of 
putting this would be to say that each heterogeneous multiplicity is an 
ordered whole of difference. But as Bergson’s ontology continues, each of 
these ordered wholes can themselves be related to other orders that differ 
precisely in the degree of their difference – the different ways in which each 
order makes a singularity of difference. Intensive quantities obey the same 
ontology. On the one hand, every intensity is ordered as a continuous 
heterogeneity (as opposed to discrete homogeneities that give themselves to 
be added and divided without prejudice). But on the other hand, each of 
these intensities is itself within an order or continuum of difference, 
hierarchized according to ascending and descending degrees.8 Thus every 
intensity is an ordered whole within an order, and their demarcation from 
one another determines at once both their internal heterogeneity 
(endoconsistency) as well as the external relations of that continuous 
heterogeneity to another (exoconsistency). Difference can then be said to 
occur both at every level and between every level in precisely that way in which 
they differ.9 
As the above presentation of intensity suggests, an intensity is defined 
by the singular nature of its difference. The identity of an intensity is thus 
produced by difference. This theme of constitutive difference is of course a 
central concern throughout Difference and Repetition. It is, however, Deleuze’s 
final treatment of difference that is arguably of most significance to a 
philosophy of history. In this concluding chapter, Deleuze’s primary concern 
is not so much with the difference between the past, present and future (the 
topic of chapter 2), but rather “differences of level, temperature, pressure, 
tensions, potential, difference of intensity.”10 It is these differences that are the 
stuff of history; if history is concerned with the relations between past, 
present and future, it is because these relations are a necessary part of the 
intensive differences by which reality is produced. This means that while the 
philosophy of history is no doubt dependent upon a philosophy of time, an 
investigation of the latter cannot stand for the former, since history is not 
reducible to time.11 Looking ahead to the direction Deleuze will take his 
philosophy of history with Guattari, it is not difficult to see that theories of 
space will be as equally important as time: Deleuze and Guattari’s 
nomadology, for example, will be opposed to traditional history first and 
foremost on spatial and topological grounds; their geophilosophy, to 
continue, will draw its inspiration from a history that is decidedly 
geographical (Braudel’s geohistory12). These future projects, however, are 
dependent upon Deleuze’s conception of intensity-as-difference – a 
conception that complements the earlier philosophy of time in Difference and 
Repetition by specifically addressing the issue of space. 
Crucial to this differential philosophy of space is the argument that the 
world cannot be finished or exact, for if it was then it would either be dead 
or cease to exist.13 The world is therefore in extrapolation: a process of 
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continual emergence that is constantly undergoing adjustment and 
readjustment – negotiation – of various differences in intensity. These 
differences in intensity must in turn be conditioned and correlated if we are 
to make sense of the newly emerged. However, in the act of ‘making sense 
of’ difference, difference becomes reified and stratified; difference becomes 
fixed, and as such emptied of its difference. This means that while an 
intensive difference is productive of extensive reality, in so doing it 
abolishes itself as a difference. More precisely, intensity-as-difference covers 
over, cancels out, and/or extends itself into an extensity or quality that in 
one and the same stroke identifies the existence of the intensive difference 
while effacing it: intensity, in other words, is suicidal. As Deleuze says: 
Intensity is difference, but this difference tends to deny or 
to cancel itself out in extensity and underneath quality. It 
is true that qualities are signs which flash across the 
interval of a difference. In so doing, however, they 
measure the time of an equalization – in other words, the 
time taken by the difference to cancel itself out in the 
extensity in which it is distributed.14 
The paradoxical nature of intensity is thus as follows: on the one hand, the 
intensive is that which resists being sensed “independently of the qualities 
which cover it and the extensity in which it is distributed”; but on the other 
hand, intensity is the only thing which can be sensed, “since it is what gives 
to be sensed, and defines the proper limits of sensibility.”15 This means that 
although intensity destroys itself, it only does so as a result of its own 
productive and metamorphic power. Put otherwise, the explication of an 
intensive force is not so much a dissipation as it is a creative explosion. 
Deleuze emphasises this distinction between a dissipation of force and 
an affirmative explication of it in his discussion of thermodynamics. As he 
notes, despite its affinity with process and change, classical thermodynamics 
was overly concerned with the eventual equalisation of that change.16 In so 
doing, classical thermodynamics turned away from an appreciation of the 
intensive processes that produce the states of equalisation. Today’s far-from-
equilibrium thermodynamics seeks to correct this oversight. As Manuel 
DeLanda explains it: “[W]hile equilibrium thermodynamics focuses on what 
happens once the intensive differences have been cancelled, far-from-
equilibrium thermodynamics studies systems that are continuously 
traversed by a strong flow of energy or matter, a flow which does not allow 
the differences in intensity to be cancelled, that is, a flow that maintains 
these differences and keeps them from cancelling themselves out.”17 Far-
from-equilibrium thermodynamics thus does not efface intensities by 
dissipating/equalising their force, but rather pushes them towards future 
productivities by keeping them open. Employing alternative Deleuzian 
terms, one could say that far-from-equilibrium dynamics does not allow 
processes of becoming to coalesce into fully static and explicated beings. 
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By invoking the ontological dualism of becoming and being, the 
question of history’s place in this schema is brought into relief. As is well 
documented, Deleuze repeatedly opposes becoming to history. To give just 
one example:  
What history grasps in an event is the way it’s actualised 
in particular circumstances; the event’s becoming is 
beyond the scope of history […]. Becoming isn’t part of 
history; history amounts to only the set of preconditions, 
however recent, that one leaves behind in order to 
‘become’, that is, to create something new.18  
In Difference and Repetition, this notion of history is specifically attacked as 
historicism and contrasted with the virtual structure of the Idea.19 History 
understood as such is thus opposed to the unknown and the creation of the 
new, for it is designated the task of capturing and representing what is 
created in an order of causal-linear succession. 
But while this reading of history in Deleuze is more or less undeniable, 
the claim of this paper is that it does not by itself stand for a Deleuzian 
philosophy of history. According to the above topology, histories are 
extensive series that spiral away on the surface from those intensive breaks 
that cause a change in kind. For instance, the historical series of “before the 
war,” “after the revolution,” “post-colonial history” or “prehistoric times” 
are all extensive series that proceed from an intensive moment/movement 
of becoming: after the intensive creations of May ’68 are captured, to take 
one example, we are presented with various extensive histories that spiral 
from and towards that point, making sense of the revolutionary event in 
various ways (or perhaps even ignoring the event itself). Two questions 
however immediately assert themselves: (1) must this scenario always occur 
in a 1-2 step process, creation occurring first and capture second?; and (2) 
could not history already be a part of the productive process that leads to 
extensive historical series? Both of these questions can be answered by 
showing how history is itself constitutive, and dynamically so. 
This can be achieved by returning to our discussion of thermodynamics. 
The issue of thermodynamics is crucial, for it is the science that is arguably 
most concerned with asymmetrical movements – the kind of movements 
that are most often associated with the onward march of history.20 More 
specifically, according to Deleuze, thermodynamics is concerned with the 
asymmetric movement from the intensive to the extensive. Thermodynamics 
thus addresses the serial movement from depth to surface, as opposed to those 
sciences that are only concerned with analysing surface series of extensity. 
The problem for classical thermodynamics, to recap our discussion above, 
was that in pursing the equalisation of intensive processes, it promoted an 
ontology in which a final future state acted as an inescapable attractor – 
what Bergson would call radical finalism.21 With equalisation as its raison 
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d’être, classical thermodynamics was only capable of proving its own 
presuppositions. This in turn discredited the effectivity of the process in 
realising the final state – the road travelled rendered inconsequential. In 
contrast to this, far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics attempts to avert this 
equalisation and thus evade a radical finalism. As a result, the productivity 
of intensity remains open and active, undecided and contingent. This means 
that the line drawn from depth to surface is not an ineffectual shadow of the 
final state, but is truly productive of what it is that comes about. But what 
are these various paths to equilibria if not differentiated histories by which a 
thermodynamic force moves towards explication? As DeLanda puts it when 
distinguishing classical from far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics: 
[I]nstead of the single global equilibrium of the classical 
theory we now have multiple equilibria, which means that 
history matters. While with a single possible outcome the 
different paths followed by systems on their way there can 
be ignored, with multiple possible outcomes the details of 
the history followed matter.22 
When the result is known in advance, who cares for history? Such a 
history is a mere formality – an extensive series that always leads to and 
issues from the already known. But in far-from-equilibrium 
thermodynamics history can no longer be taken for granted; history becomes 
constitutive at precisely that point where the future becomes open. When 
the future is genuinely unknown, it matters a great deal whether we turn left 
of right at the next junction, for these details will contour the field of 
possibility, creating and closing alternatives. While it is not my intention 
here to suggest a vulgar tree diagram of history, it must nevertheless be 
acknowledged that in any particular instance certain outcomes are more 
likely (physically attractive) than others. This empirical fact cannot be 
denied. But as much modern science testifies, attractors need not be radically 
mechanistic or deterministic: while there may be basins of attraction, this 
does not preclude their emergent alteration. The critical point is, however, 
the following: the contingencies of historical encounters are in part 
responsible for the movements from one phase-space or basin of attraction 
to another. Thus to allow for the contingency of the event is to affirm the 
historical processes of production, not to deny them. Unlike the historical 
series of extensive surfaces, the historical processes of production are utterly 
different in kind, for they are indeed productive of historical extensities.  
It must be admitted, however, that this analysis of productive intensity 
has yet to establish a clear link with what I am referring to as the historical 
processes of production. To properly achieve this we must now look more 
closely at what Deleuze means by depth. 
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In the Depths of History 
As noted above, extensive quantities can be divided and added together 
due to their adherence to whole-part relations. This aspect is, however, more 
than just a simple capability: extensive quantities are themselves only given 
insofar as they express a whole-part relation. For example, what is high is 
determined by its relation to what is low, what is right is determined by its 
relation to what is left, and so on. But as Deleuze points out, surely “right” 
must be more than just “to the right”; it must be more than just an inverted 
“left,” for if it were not then the two would fail to genuinely differ in kind. 
Therefore, if right is to maintain a difference in kind to left, then the 
extensity of right within an external relation must be predicated upon the 
intensive determination of right within itself. This is to say that the measure 
of an intensive quantity is always given according to its own metric. 
Intensities submit to no standard, for they are indeed that which produces 
standards – standards are made of them. Insofar as the measure of an 
intensity always comes from within, what is being measured is none other 
than the depth of that intensity. It is therefore in depth and through depth 
that the productive processes of intensities take place. As Deleuze says, 
while an extensive quantity measures distance, length or size, these 
determinations themselves “flow from a ‘deeper’ instance – depth itself, 
which is not an extension but a pure implex.”23 And again: 
Extensity does not develop or appear without presenting a 
left and a right, a high and a low, an above and a below, 
which are like the dissymmetrical marks of its own origin. 
The relativity of these determinations, moreover, is further 
testimony to the absolute from which they come. Extensity 
as a whole comes from the depths. Depth as the (ultimate 
and original) heterogeneous dimension is the matrix of all 
extensity […].24 
As this passage shows us, the relational marks that set out the scale or 
hierarchy of a series form scars that betray an originary injury – “the 
absolute from which they come.” This absolute is depth. However, it is a 
heterogeneous absolute, a matrix that makes whole of a multiplicity: “The 
original depth […] is indeed space as a whole, but space as an intensive 
quantity: the pure spatium.”25 But if it is in depth that a measure of worth is 
given, then in order to gauge it we must delve into it; extensive assessment 
will not suffice, we must place ourselves within depth in order to feel its 
own internal pulse or rhythm. 
When so put, Deleuze’s intensive-depth can be seen to have much in 
common with the notion of productive-depth used by his conceptual 
forebears. Take Bergson to begin with. I have already shown how Deleuze’s 
understanding of intensity draws from Bergson’s heterogeneous 
multiplicity. It is, however, Bergson’s heterogeneous multiplicity of duration 
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in particular that is most instructive for Deleuzian depth. In solving Zeno’s 
paradox of the footrace between Achilles and the tortoise, Bergson 
demonstrates that Achilles will never pass the tortoise so long as time and 
motion is reduced to a homogeneous plane of space. As with the trajectory 
of an arrow, each stride of both Achilles and the tortoise is an indivisible 
movement, meaning, it cannot be divided without changing it in kind. Each 
stride, as it were, comes from the depths of their respective durations. While 
these different durations can in turn be mapped onto an extensive space – 
the ground they are racing on – this does not mean that their intensive 
durations can be reduced to this shared homogeneous space: 
But the truth is that each of Achilles’ steps is a simple 
indivisible act, and that, after a given number of these acts, 
Achilles will have passed the tortoise. The mistake of the 
Eleatics arises from their identification of this series of 
acts, each of which is of a definite kind and indivisible, with 
the homogeneous space which underlies them.26 
When the duration of Achilles is defined by the homogeneous space he 
shares with the tortoise, Zeno’s paradox arises - every time Achilles attempts 
to bridge the final gap, he must first cover half that distance. Thus as long as 
Achilles’ stride can be extensively divided without changing it in kind (i.e. 
without the realisation that it is no longer Achilles who is racing), he will be 
unable to reach the tortoise. But if the stride of Achilles is taken as a 
continuous motion of duration, an indivisible intensity that is greater in 
magnitude than the intensive quantity of the tortoise, then Achilles will be 
able to take that final step to victory. Zeno knows as well as anyone that 
Achilles must win. He knows that while his paradox appears to hold on 
paper, that in the flesh Achilles will clearly streak by the tortoise. Bergson’s 
insight is to take this distinction between the static representation of motion 
in homogeneous space and the vital movement of heterogeneous time in 
duration seriously: “Why resort to a metaphysical hypothesis, however 
ingenious, about the nature of space, time and motion, when immediate 
intuition shows us motion within duration, and duration outside space?”27 
This means that to consider the race in real duration, one must draw a 
continuous line of heterogeneity from the depths of the past to the present 
moment that is emerging. It is only by doing so that we can gauge the 
confluence of multiple durations (e.g. Achilles’, the tortoise’s and ours) and 
thus experience the passing of time. For this reason, if time is to be vital and 
ongoing, it must be connected not as a discrete plane of homogeneity but as 
a continuous multiplicity of heterogeneity. The present moment must not be 
severed from the depths of the past, but made thick with it: 
Let us […] grasp ourselves afresh as we are, in a present 
which is thick, and furthermore, elastic, which we can 
stretch indefinitely backward by pushing the screen which 
masks us from ourselves farther and farther away; let us 
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grasp afresh the external world as it really is, not 
superficially, in the present, but in depth, with the 
immediate past crowding upon it and imprinting upon it 
its impetus; let us in a word become accustomed to see all 
things sub specie durationis: immediately in our galvanized 
perception what is taut becomes relaxed, what is dormant 
awakens, what is dead comes to life again.28 
Although it is not mentioned in the above passage, what Bergson is 
specifically describing here is his notion of philosophical intuition. Unlike 
the intellect, which concerns itself with analysing static extensive matter, 
intuition for Bergson is the form of knowledge through which one follows 
an intensive movement. Beginning with his analysis of intuition in 
Bergsonism, Deleuze will rely upon this method of knowledge throughout 
his career.29 The current objective of this paper, however, is to emphasise 
how Bergsonian intuition requires depth for its explanation: intuition is 
precisely that which has depth, as opposed to (a) the instinct which is 
flattened intuition,30 and (b) the intellect which is cut out from intuition;31 
Bergsonian intuition is that which moves from the depths of duration, as 
opposed to the intellect which serves to solidify the movements of intuition 
for static investigation;32 and finally, intuition is a selection mechanism 
capable of ensuring appropriateness to and for each organism by gauging 
the thickness or richness – in other words, depth – of an organism’s “zone of 
indetermination.”33 In each case, while it is always an extensive surface that 
offers itself up for analysis, this analysis is itself dependent upon an 
appropriate intuition that always occurs within (or more accurately comes 
forth from) the depths: 
Let us then go down into our inner selves: the deeper the 
point we touch, the stronger will be the thrust which 
sends us back to the surface. Philosophical intuition is this 
contact, philosophy is this impetus. Brought back to the 
surface by an impulsion from the depth, we shall regain 
contact with science as our thought opens out and 
disperses.34 
Furthermore, insofar as this impetus from the depths to the surface 
concerns a proper duration rather than an extensive image of static time, it 
concerns a movement from the past to the present – the thickening of a 
present moment as it is stretched backwards. Thus the placing of ourselves 
into the intensive-depths is the placing of ourselves within the past as it 
moves towards the present, making a continuity or composite of the two (a 
whole duration). What defines this continuity is that it cannot be dissected 
into isolated parts without changing it in kind, for as soon as this is done, we 
are in the realm of surface extensities. This means that an historical trajectory 
from the past itself to the present, as opposed to those historical series which 
fully reside on the surface, cannot be cut and rearranged without changing 
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its nature. If one is to appropriately understand the past as it moves to the 
present, one must therefore consider an entire duration in its depths, for as 
this depth changes so too will what is an appropriate understanding of it: 
“But the truth is that we shall never reach the past unless we frankly place 
ourselves within it.”35 
The resonance of this last quote with the remarks of Braudel and Péguy 
mooted at the start of this paper could not be clearer. Let us then explore in 
more detail what their alternative form of history is. As mentioned, 
Braudel’s ambition is to promote “a genuinely new form” of history.36 
According to Braudel, the dominant practice and theory of history ignores 
and/or stifles life. In light of this: “It is precisely our task [as historians] to 
get beyond this first stage of history”, in order that we can reach this other 
history capable of tackling social realities “in themselves and for themselves.”37 
Because it is this other form of history that is best suited to investigating life, 
Braudel proclaims: “As I have said before, it is life which is our school.”38 
Braudel even goes so far as to make the two synonymous: “Just like life 
itself, history seems to us to be a fleeting spectacle, always in movement, 
made up of a web of problems meshed inextricably together, and able to 
assume a hundred different and contradictory aspects in turn.”39 By now it 
is obvious that for Braudel history need not be opposed to life, movement, 
contingency or becoming. The immediate question is: “How should one 
tackle such a complex, living entity?”40 Just as Bergson insists that the two 
forms of knowledge (intellect and intuition) demand their own respective 
methods of inquiry, so too Braudel notes that “each form of history demands 
an appropriate erudition.”41 Furthermore, when prosecuting a Braudelian 
history, one must not reduce all and sundry to the one extensive time, but 
must rather be attuned to the various different durations involved. When 
one fails to do so, 
This necessarily entails enormous errors of perspective 
and of reasoning, for what they are thus attempting to 
reconcile, to fit into the same framework, are in fact 
movements which have neither the same duration, nor the 
same direction, some belonging to the time of men, of our 
own brief, transient lives, others partaking of the time of 
societies, for whom a day, a year hold hardly any 
meaning, for whom, sometimes, a whole century lasts but 
a moment. Though we must of course be clear that social 
time does not flow at one even rate, but goes at a thousand 
different paces, swift or slow, which bear almost no 
relation to the day-to-day rhythm of a chronicle or of 
traditional history.42 
Braudel’s insistence on the multiple nature of duration similarly holds for 
the complexity of history’s schematisation: 
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There is no unilateral history. No one thing is exclusively 
dominant: neither the conflict between races, whose 
collisions or reconciliation supposedly shaped the whole 
of man’s past; nor powerful economic rhythms, creators of 
progress or ruin; nor constant social tensions; nor that 
diffused spiritualism that those like Ranke see as the 
sublimation of the individual and of the whole vast body 
of history; nor the reign of technology; nor the 
demographic expansion, that vegetable expansion with all 
its eventual consequences for the life of communities. 
Man’s complexity is yet other.43 
As to how this complexity can be appropriately approached, Braudel’s 
answer is Bergson’s: these different durations and complex histories are 
found “in the depths and most often in silence, whose domain, immense and 
uncertain as it is, we must now approach.”44 
As a follower of Bergson, it is not surprising that Péguy will also share 
much with this approach.45 We have already seen how Péguy distinguishes 
between two ways of considering the event, one which consists in recording 
its effectuation in history and another which involves reassembling the 
event and installing oneself in it. Deleuze will rely on these heavily in order 
to oppose history and becoming. However, if we look beyond this oft-
quoted passage to the rest of Péguy’s historical essays, we can see that what 
Péguy has in mind is an alternative historical method that does not merely 
trade in historical extensities on the surface but rather investigates historical 
events in depth. As Péguy writes, musing on what he would wish for instead 
of the litany of (republican) documents he consistently receives to be 
published in his journal Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine: 
History will always tell us about the big chiefs, the leaders 
of history, more or less well, less rather than more, that’s 
its métier; and if history does not, then historians will, and 
if historians do not then the professors (of history) will. 
What we want to know, and what we cannot invent, what 
we want to know more about, are not the principal roles, 
the leading stars, the grand drama, the stage, the spectacle; 
what we want to know is what went on behind, below, 
beneath the surface, what the people of France were like; 
in fact, what we want to know is the tissue of the people in 
that heroic age, the texture of the republican party. What 
we want to know is the texture, the very tissue of the 
bourgeoisie, of the Republic, of the people, when the 
bourgeoisie was great, when the people was great, when 
the republicans were heroic, and the Republic had clean 
hands. And to leave nothing unsaid, when Republicans 
were republicans, and the Republic was the republic. 
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What we want is not a Sunday version of history, but the 
history of every day of the week, a people in the ordinary 
texture of its daily life; working and earning, working for 
its daily bread, panem quotidianum; a race in its reality, 
displayed in all its depth.46 
Péguy’s concern here is thus not with the facts of history per se, but with the 
culture that produces those facts. This may put him at odds with those forms 
of history that concern themselves with the analysis of historical extensities, 
but insofar as it does, it suggests to us another kind of historical technique 
and understanding – one that demands we become acquainted with a 
culture “displayed in all its depth” if we are to appropriately intimate its 
historical processes of production. 
As it happens, exemplifying this alternative historical ontology and 
methodology was Péguy’s original purpose for writing the essay the above 
passage is taken from. In 1907, Péguy was approached by the well-known 
Dreyfusard, Joseph Reinach, to write a history of the Dreyfus Affair. 
Declining to do so himself, Péguy in turn asked his friend Daniel Halévy to 
produce a historical account for his Cahiers.  However, after publishing 
Halévy’s account, titled Apology for Our Past, Péguy responded less than a 
year later with his own rival version, titled Memories of Youth (Notre Jeunesse). 
This was necessitated, Péguy believed, by the inability of Halévy’s history to 
convey the appropriate spirit (mystique) of the Dreyfusard movement. 
Halévy most surely had many of the factual details correct, but what he 
failed to express was the life of the event – the vital and evolving forces that 
shaped the historical event and continued to be felt in the present.47 
Memories of Youth was thus an attempt by Péguy to show how an alternative 
form of history is possible, one that is not disinterested and aloof but alive 
and continually creative. Moreover, in order to remain faithful to the 
historical event, to become worthy of the event, as Deleuze would say,48 
Péguy sought to place himself back within its depths in order to feel its 
vibrancy and live its contingency. Péguy’s history, as such, was not written 
from the privileged perspective of hindsight, replacing possibility with a 
retrospective historicism. Rather, it was expressed from within the depths of 
an historical movement that continues to speak to us today. 
It should be noted that these thinkers of depth have not been called 
upon randomly. On the contrary, Braudel and Péguy are both specifically 
cited as the inspiration for Deleuze and Guattari’s own alternative to 
traditional history.49 And to the extent that this alternative revolves around a 
theory of becoming that is predicated upon Bergson’s notions of the virtual, 
multiplicity and duration, it is equally clear that Bergson’s philosophy of 
historical depth is of great pertinence to Deleuze’s.  However, in recognising 
the affinity between Deleuze’s understanding of depth – the pure spatium 
from which intensive production emerges – and the conceptions of depth in 
Bergson, Braudel and Péguy, the place and purpose of history in these 
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accounts is called into question. Whereas depth for Bergson, Braudel and 
Péguy is in many respects a historical depth that is intensively productive in 
relation to the present and future, for Deleuze depth is a realm of becoming 
that is in turn overlaid by historical extensities.  How then are we to explain 
this discrepancy? 
It could be suggested that Deleuze repositions Bergson, Braudel and 
Péguy against history in order to emphasise the futural focus of his own 
philosophy. But while there is some truth to this, the case must not be 
overstated. Indeed, if the above historical thinkers can be said to have a 
common thread, it is precisely the great concern they all show for the future 
and the new. Given this, even if the bringing forth of the new is Deleuze’s 
ultimate aim, the critical question remains: what role does history play in 
this process; what is the relation between the depths of the past and that 
which is yet to come? 
In posing such a problematic, Deleuze’s philosophy of space in the final 
chapter of Difference and Repetition is acutely reunited with his previous 
philosophy of time (from chapter two of Difference and Repetition). As he 
says: 
We should not be surprised that the pure spatial syntheses 
here repeat the temporal syntheses previously specified: 
the explication of extensity rests upon the first synthesis, 
that of habit or the present; but the implication of depth 
rests upon the second synthesis, that of Memory and the 
past. Furthermore, in depth the proximity and simmering 
of the third synthesis make themselves felt, announcing 
the universal ‘ungrounding’. Depth is like the famous 
geological line from NE to SW, the line which comes 
diagonally from the heart of things and distributes 
volcanoes: it unites a bubbling sensibility and a thought 
which ‘rumbles in its crater’. Schelling said that depth is 
not added from without to length and breadth, but 
remains buried, like the sublime principle of the differend 
which creates them.50 
What is most interesting about this alignment of the syntheses of space with 
the syntheses of time is that although this passage gestures to the third 
synthesis of the future – that which is beyond depth – Deleuze’s interest here 
is more precisely with the way in which depth points towards the beyond. It 
is furthermore always in depth that the third synthesis makes itself felt. And 
finally, as Deleuze extrapolates when rounding off his discussion of 
intensive-depth: “The fact that they [intensities] cannot be added in any 
order whatsoever, or that they have an essential relation to an order of 
succession, refers us back to the synthesis of time which acts in depth.”51 From 
this we can see that although depth is associated with the second synthesis 
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of the past, both are not contrary to creation but an active participant in the 
process: “one does not hold without the other.”52 
 Accordingly, if the explanation of intensive-depth as an alternative 
form of history is significant, it is because it will address exactly how history 
can provide an opening towards the future, rather than a closure of it. Such a 
suggestion may betray the letter of Deleuze’s theory, finding history where 
he placed becoming, but it is arguably more condusive to the kind of 
alternative to traditional history that Deleuze was seeking – an alternative 
history in line with Bergson, Braudel and Péguy that is intensive and 
capable of creation in concert with the present and future. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this paper I have explored the concepts of intensity and 
depth, as found in chapter 5 of Difference and Repetition and compared with 
the work of Bergson, Braudel and Péguy, in order to see what they might 
offer a Deleuzian philosophy of history. This project has been predicated 
upon the initial observation that Deleuze’s hostility towards history is 
highly superficial: while it is true that Deleuze criticises history for its 
association with representation, explication, being and the actual, this is by 
no means the final word on history in Deleuze – it is only the first. Aside 
from this image of history-as-historicism, there is another history in the 
work of Deleuze, a history that draws its inspiration from the lineage of 
historical thinkers who themselves attempted to escape the dominant 
tradition.53 While it might be thought that Deleuze employs these thinkers to 
attack history in toto, this paper has shown how this negative construal can 
be replaced by a more positive project: namely, the affirmation of a creative 
philosophy of history. 
History, in this respect, can be said to operate along two different axes. 
On the one hand, there are extensive histories: histories which order a series 
of extensive positions. These histories more or less resemble eulogies – a 
retrospective chronicle of a life. But, on the other hand, for each of these 
overlapping and encompassing historical series there is a correlate process 
of production. Each extensive series is the explication of a creative intensity; 
each one, as it were, has its own requisite depth or zone of intensity – that 
internal and novel story of genesis that is responsible for its identifiable 
distinction and differentiation from others. Insofar as “history matters” in 
the production and selection of each zone of intensity, history, as such, has a 
second axis, and this is found in the depths of intensity. This axis of history 
calls for a different kind of erudition, a method of intuition that allows us to 
follow an intensive movement along its progression from the depths to the 
surface. 
By allowing for this distinction, history need no longer be opposed to 
becoming or the production of the new. Rather, history, as an intensive-
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depth, might be precisely that which enables an opening towards the future. 
Far from being a force of capture or domination (pouvoir), history might 
rather be an integral and active constituent in the process of creation 
(puissance), thus transforming the supposed opposition of history and 
becoming into a creative and differential composite. If this creative form of 
history is not immediately obvious in Deleuze’s work, it is because it lies 
beneath the surface, in the depths of his thought. It is therefore imperative 
that we place ourselves within this historical thought, where it is actively 
working and producing.  
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